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Confrontation Clause

Supreme Court began to backtrack from its previous
positions on civ il rights and issued five rulings that made
it more difficult to prove discrimination under Title VII
(em ployment discri mination) and other statutes . Congress, wo rking in tandem with civil rights groups, crafted
legislation that nu ll ifIed these and other restrictive
decisio ns. By enacting the 199 1 Act, Co ngress overturned
nine Rehnquist C ourt decisions, made it eas ier for civil
rights plaintiffs to bring laws uits, and became the civi l
rights es tablishment's so-called court of last reso rt.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISS UES

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
O n both statutory and constitutional questio ns, Co ngress
has sign ificant power and respons ibili ty to respond to
Sup reme Co urt decisio ns. O n statutory matters, there is
no ques tion that Congress may negate a Supreme Court
interpretatio n by enacting new legislatio n. Co nside r, for
exampl e, co ngressio nal efforts to countermand Rehnquist
Co urt interpretations of federal civi l right statutes, the
1987 C ivil Rights Resto ration Act, and the 1991 C ivi l
Ri ghts Act. T he 198 7 stature nega ted a 1984 Supreme
Co urt decisio n, Grove City College v. lJell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984). Ru li ng that on ly the parts of the college that
actually received federal aid we re subj ect to federal civil
rights laws (a nd not the college as a whole), Grove City
severely limited th e reach of fed eral civil rights protections. T he Resto ration Act rejected that interpretatio n,
making clea r that the entire o rga nization is subj ect to
fede ral civil ri ghts protections when any program or
activity rece ives federal ass istance.
T he 199 1 C ivil l\ights Act is a mo re dramatic
exa mple of Co ngress's power to respond . In 1989, th e
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On constitu tional questions, there is significant controversy about the scope of Congress's power to respo nd.
The reaso n for this is tb at the press, the Ame rican people,
some members of C ongress, and especially the Sup reme
Court treat Court constitutional rulings as ftn al and
deftnitive. For exa mple, when reporting that six out of ten
Americans tho ught the Supreme Court was t he ultimate
constitutional arbiter, newspapers simply noted that those
s ix we re "correct" (Marcus 1987, p. Al3). Likew ise, after
Reagan's attorn ey general, Edwin M eese (1931 -), argued
t hat Supreme Court decisio ns were not " b inding on all
persons and parts of government hencefo rth and forevermore," the Senate Judiciary Commirtee was alarmed,
aski ng Supreme Court nom inees to comment o n Meese's
speech (Meese 1987, p. 983).
For its part, the Supreme Court stridently defe nds its
power to interpret the Co nstitutio n. Beginning with C hief
Justice Jo hn Marshall's declaratio n in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U .S. 137 (I803) that it is "emphatically rhe
province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is," th e Supreme Court regu larly insists that it
alo ne delive rs the ftnal wo rd on the mean ing of the
Constitution . Acco rdin g to a subsequent decision, Marbtuy " declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary
is supreme in the expositio n of the law of the
Co nstitutio n" (Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U .S. 1 [1958]). In
a memorable aphorism, Justi ce Ro bert H. Jackso n claimed
that decisio ns by the Supreme Court "are not ftnal
because we are infallible, but we are infallibl e o nl y because
we are ftna l" (Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 [1 953]) . Yet,
the h istorica l record, as well as the text of the
Constitutio n, provides overwhelming evidence that Court
pronoun cements are anything but fInal. Instead, Court
pronoun cements are part of a circular process bindi ng the
parties in a particular case but oth elwise servi ng as one
moment in an ongoing co nstitutional dialogue between
the courts, elected officials, and the America n people.
T he Co nstitution , fo r exam ple, anticipates th at
Congress wi ll play an important part in shaping the
Co nstitution 's meaning. All public officers are required by
Article VI, clause three " to support this C o nstitutio n. "
T hat obligatio n is supp lemented by federal law, under
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which all legislative officials "solemnly swear (or affirm) ...
ro supporr and defend the Co nstitution" (5
§ 333 1
[1994]). The Constiturion, moreover, anricipates that
lawmakers will respond to Supreme Coun rulings. It
empowers Co ngress to, among other things, impeach
judges, make exceptions to the jurisdicrion offederal COUITS,
confirm judicial nominations, and amend the Constiturion
(in conjunction with the states, three-fourths of which must
approve consticutional amendment proposals). Over the
years, Congress has m ade use of all of these powers to signal
its approval or disapproval of federal court decisions.
In the rwenty-first centu ry it seems farfetched that
Congress would impeach federal coun judges to express
disapproval with court decisions. At the time of Marbury v.
Madison, however, Congress seemed quite willing ro use its
impeachmenr power to check the federal judiciary. After
the 1800 elections (where the Jeffersonians rook control of
the White House and Congress from the Federalists),
Federalist district judge John Pickering (J 737-1805) was
impeached and removed, and actio n against Supreme
Court Justice Samuel C hase (1741-1811) began. For this
very reason, the Supreme Court could not issue a
meaningful remedy against the Jefferson administration
in Marbury v. Madison (a case in which a Federalist judicial
appointee challenged the Jefferso n administration for
fililing to deliver his judicial co mmission ro him) . Indeed,
C hief justice Marshall was co ncerned abour impeachment,
writing ro Justi ce C hase that " a reversal of those legal
opinions deemed unsound by the legislature wo uld
certainly better comport w ith the mildness of our character
than a removal of the judge who has rendered them
unknowing of his fa ult" (Beveridge 191 9, p. 177).

u.s.c.

COURT JURISDI CTION
Article III , clause rwo makes the Supreme Court'S appellate
jurisdiction subject ro "such exceptions" and "such
regulations as the Congress shall mal<e." On numerous
occasions, Congress has threatened ro strip the Court of
jurisdiction in respo nse ro decisions it disli kes. From 19 53
to 1968, Co ngress saw Court stripping as a way ro
countermand the Warren Court-over sixty bills were
introduced ro limit the jurisdiction of the federal COUITS
over school desegregation, national securiry, criminal
co nfess io ns, and much more. And while o nly one of these
bills passed (limiting the access of alleged Co mmunists ro
government documents) , Congress came close ro enacting
legislation that wo uld have stripped the Supreme Coun of
jurisdiction in five domestic security areas. In the late 1970s
and 1980s, Co ngress again targeted the Supreme Court. An
am endment to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over
school prayer was approved by the Senate in 1979;
proposals ro limit court jurisdiction over abortion and
school desegregation were also given serious consideration.
More recently, Co ngress has take n aim at federal and state

court decisions on gay marriage, the pledge of allegiance,
the public display of the Ten Command ments, and judicial
invocations of international law. None of these statutes was
enacted, although limits on court jurisdi ction over same-sex
marriage and the pledge of allegian ce were approved by the
House of Representatives in 2004.
In 2005 and 2006, Congress responded ro coun
decisions by enacting legislation affecting federal court
jurisdiction . In 2005, Congress expressed disapproval
with state court decis ion-maki ng in the Terri Schiavo case
by expa nding federal coun jurisd iction. Speciflcally, rather
than accept state court findings that Sch iavo, then in a
persistent vegetative state, wo uld rather die than be kept
alive artiflcially, Congress as ked the federal courts to sort
out whether the removal of a feed ing tube violated
Schiavo's constiturional rights (For the Relief of the
Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo Act).
In 2006, Congress limited the habeas corpus rights of
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. Responding ro a
Supreme Coun ruling Hamdan v. Rumsftld, 548 u.s. _
(2006), which extended Geneva Co nvention protectio ns
ro enemy combatanrs, Congress enacted the MilitalY
Co mmission Act. This statute authorized limited federal
court review of military commiss ion determinations that a
detainee is an enemy combata nt. More signiflcant, the
Military Commissions Act prohibited federal court
consideration of habeas co rpus petitions by G uanra namo
detainees, limiting their rights to those afforded them by
military comm issions. When enacti ng the statute, it is
unclear whether lawmakers intended ro cou ntermand the
Hamdan Court or, instead, acce pted the Court's invitation ro grant "the Pres ident the legislative authori ry ro
create military comm iss ions at issue here."
Another constiwtio nally autho rized mechanism ro
countermand Supreme Court decision-making is the
Article V amendment process. The Eleventh Amendment
(ratifled in 1795) was a respo nse ro the Supreme Court's
decision in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S . 4 19 (1793). Chisolm
ruled that states could be sued in federal courts by citizens of
another state; the Eleventh Amendment explicitly forbids
such laws ui ts. T he T hirteenth Amendment (ratified in
1865) outlawed slavery and, in so doing, nullifled Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Sin ce the
Reco nstruction, however, Congress has rarely amended
the Constitution in response to Court decisio ns. T hat has
not stopped lawmakers from seriously co ntemplating such
amendments and constiw tional amendment proposals
have been co nsidered in response ro Co urt decisions on
child labor, abortion , school prayer, and gender equali ty.
APPOINTMENT OF JU STICES
Perhaps the principal way that Congress respo nds ro Court
decisions is through its power both to co nfirm Supreme
Coun nominees and determine the number of justices who
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sit on th e C ourt. T he process by which the pres ident
ap points and th e Senate confirms Supreme Court nominees
is often used to change the direction of Co ur t decisions. For
example, after th e Supreme C ourt ruled paper money
unco nstituti o nal in 1870, Pres ident Ulysses S. G rant
(1822- 1885) nom inated, and the Senate confirm ed, rwo
justices who vo ted the ve ry nex t year to overturn th at
decision in Legal Tender CaseJ, 79 U. S. 467 (1871). T he
Senate likewise backed President Franklin D . Roosevelt's
efforts to appo int justi ces su pportive of eco no mic regulation, es peciall y C ongress's use of the commerce clause as an
agent of social change. From , th ese N ew D eal appointees
overturned decisio ns and, in so do ing, paved the way for the
modern regulatory state. D uring the peri od from 1937 to
1944, thirty decisio ns we re overrul ed.
Se nate su pport fo r Roosevel t's Supreme C o urt picks,
however, d id not translate into Senate support for
Roosevelt's controversial C ourt-packin g plan . Before
Supreme C o urt vaca ncies allowed him to reshape
consti[Utional law, Roosevelt felt stymied by a probusin ess Supreme C o ure. His so lu tio n was to increase the
size of the Court so that the balance of power wou ld shi ft
to pro-New D eal Justices. C ongress took this proposal
seri o usly and there was good reason to think that it wou ld
back th e Pres ident. However, throu gh the so-called switch
in tim e that saved nin e, th e Supreme C o urt reversed
co urse o n its ow n. Fo r its part, Congress saw no reason to
check a Co urt that see med w illing to check itself.

make use of an alternative power (the taxing power) to
enact child labor legislation . Again , the Supreme Court
struck the statute down (Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U .S.
20 [1922]) . In 1938, afte r th e Court's composition had
changed, C ongress aga in based child labor legislation o n
commerce clause legislation that a un animo us Court
u pheld (United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 [1941]).

LEGI SLATIVE RESPONSES

T he RLU1PA statute highlights Congress's willingness to res pond to a C ourt ruling by advancing its policy
agenda in ways thar it thin ks the Court w ill approve.
W hen enacting RLUIPA, law makers paid close arrention
to the Supreme Court decision invalidating the RFRA
w ith Boerne v. Flores, 52 1 U.S . 507 (997) , seeking to
advance their policy age nda while no t calling into
ques tion the Co urt's handiwork. Likewise, afrer the
Supreme C ourt invalidated a stature banning guns w ithin
1,000 fee l' of a schoo l (as an impermissibl e exercise of
Congress's co mmerce power) in United States v. Lopez,
5 14 U .S. 548 (1995), Co ngress amended the G un- Free
School Zo nes Acr to require the federal government to
prove th at th e firea rm had either moved in inrersrate
co mmerce o r otherwise afFecred interstate co mm erce.

T he above in ve ntory, whil e signifi cant, merely scratches
the surface of poss ibl e co ngress io nal res ponses to Supreme
Co urt decisio ns. Co ngress, for examp le, may enact
legislatio n that seeks to limit the reach of Supreme Co urt
rulings . After the Su preme C ou rt uph eld abo rti on ri ghts
in Roe v. Wade, 4 10 U.S . 11 3 ( 1973), Congress blocked
the use of Medica id and orher federal funds to pay for
abortions. Co ngress also o ffe red reli gious o rga ni zatio ns
federal funds to promote sex ual abstinence as a method of
birth co ntrol. T he Supreme COUIT ap proved both of these
sta[Utes and , in so doing, val idated Congress's use of its
appropriatio n powers to res po nd to Supreme C ourt
rulings (Harris 1). M~Rae, 448 U .S. 297 [1980]). T he
Supreme C o urt also uph eld a 2003 federal stat ute
prohibitin g intact dilations and ex tractio ns, enacted in
res po nse to a 2000 C ourt ruling th at a state ban on socalled partial b irth abortio ns was unconstitutionally vague
(Go nzales v. Cmhart, 55 0 U. S. _
(2007 1).
C o ngress may also res pond to a Supreme C ourt
decisio n by reenacting a statute that the Court struck
down. Fo r example, C ongress strongly d isagreed with the
Co urt's 1918 rulin g thar the co mmerce powe r could not be
used to regulate child labo r (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.
S. 25 1 [ 19 18]) . Th e very nex t year, C ongress sought to
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Co ngress has also taken aim at Court decisions
through its powers to enfo rce the Fourteenth (equal
prorection) and Fifteenth (voting ri ghts) Amendments.
Rejecting a 1980 Supreme Court decision requiring civil
rights plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination in vo te
d ilution cases (Mo bile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 [1980]) ,
Congress amended the Vo ting Rights Act to allow for
impact-based proof.~ of vote dilution. Co ngress likewise
disapproved of the 1990 Suprem e Coun decisio n in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990) that
limired rhe abiliry of plaintiffs to succeed in religious
liberty lawsui ts, and enacted legislatio n thar required
gove rnmental acto rs to have a "compelling governmental
interest" whenever religious libeny was " burdened. " T his
legislation , the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) , was subsequently invalidared by the Supreme
Court in City of Boerne 1). Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Unwilling to accept defeat, Co ngress enacted a scaled
down ve rsion of the RFRA, rhe Religious Land Use and
lnsrirlltio nalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), a sratute thar the
Supreme Court upheld (against a preliminalY challenge)
in 2005 (Cutter v. Willeinson, 544 U .S. 709 [2005]) .

Anot her way th at Congress expresses its disagreement
wirh the Supreme Court is to protecr ri ghts rhat the Court
says it need no t pro tecr. Following a 1986 Supreme Court
decis io n upho lding an Air Force regulatio n that had
prohibited an observant Jew fro m wea rin g a ya rmulke in
Golden v. Weinburger, 475 U. S. 503, Co ngress enacted
legislation allowing service members to ex press their faith
by wearing neat and conservarive religiOUS apparel. In
1999, C ongress responded to concerns that independenr
co unsels were overzealous when inves tigating high-ranking
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Constitutional Convention, Framing

executive branch officials. Specifically, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's lopsided seven-to-one approval of this
statute with the decision of Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, in 1988, Congress concluded that the statute was
fundamentally flawed and ought not to be reauthorized
with the Ethics in Government Act.
Congressional responses to Supreme Court decisions
are not always hostile. Sometimes the Court invites
Congress to enact legislation that would effectively negate
a Court ruling. For example, when upholding state power
to issue search warrants of newspapers, the Court invited a
legislative response noting that its decision " does nor
prevent or advise against legislative or executive efforts to
establish nonconsititutional protections against possible
abuses of th e search warrant procedure" (Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 [1978]). Congress accepted
the invitation, passing the Privacy Protection Act of 1980
to prohibit third-party searches of newspapers.
On other occasions, Congress affirmatively assists in
the implementation of a Court decision . In response to
resistance in the South to school desegregation, Congress
took bold steps to make Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347
U.S . 483 (1954), a reality. In 1964, it prohibited segregated
school systems from receiving federal aid and authorized the
Department of] ustice to file desegregation lawsuits. These
federal efforrs proved critical to ending dual school systems.
More desegregation took place the year after these legislative
programs took effect than in the decade following Brown.
As the above discussion makes clear, the Supreme
Court does not speak the last word on the meaning of
federal statutes or the Constitution. Congress can nullifY
Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes by
enacting a new statute or amending an existing law. On
constitutional issues, the dynamic is more complex.
Congress can res pond to Supreme Court constitutional
rulings through a variety of techniques, r3.nging from the
enactment of the very same statute to the confirmation of
Supreme Court justices who are likely to distinguish or
overturn disfavored rulings. Through these varied responses to Supreme Court rulings, Congress plays a
critical role in shaping constitutional values.
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